labor encourage more work permanently-with no diminution of effectiveness? Conversely, does a permanent increase in tax rates on labor cause a permanent decline in hours worked?
Recently, Prescott (2004) argued that the substantial decline in labor supply of French, Germans and Italians in the past three decades could be fully explained by the increase in their effective marginal tax rates on labor.
(Americans today work 50 percent more than their counterparts in the Big Three Continental countries although Europeans worked more than Americans in the early 1970s.) Using a neoclassical model of labor supply, he argued that the divergence in relative hours worked between Americans and Europeans over the three decades or so could be quantitatively accounted for entirely by the difference of marginal tax rates on labor without appealing to differences in preference for leisure or subjective rate of time discount. His quantitative model, however, assumed zero international capital mobility, an assumption that might be questioned given the lowering of barriers to international capital flows between Europe and America since the late 1960s (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004) . A central result we obtain in this paper is that in a world of perfect international capital mobility, the country that raises its payroll tax rate does indeed contract employment initially. However, a reduced take-home pay rate also has negative effects on saving and thus on wealth next year and beyond. In the long run, wealth could tend to decrease in the same proportion as after-tax wages. As it is the after-tax wage relative to non-wage income from wealth ratio that determines the optimal number of hours supplied to the market (Hoon and Phelps (1996) first derived this relationship), and that ratio is pinned down by the common world interest rate, the number of hours worked is equalized across countries in the long run if preferences are identical.
1 Therefore, payroll taxes alone cannot explain 1 Hoon and Phelps (1996) explored the consequences of substituting payroll taxes for VAT and showed long-run neutrality in a small open economy but non-neutrality in a cross-country differences in employment over the long run.
We must proceed cautiously, however. If the payroll tax increase were used to finance government transfers-social assistance and social insurance, which constitute social wealth-instead of government purchases, the gradual decrease in private wealth is unable to fully offset the increase in social wealth even if the external rate of interest is exogenously given. Then the after-tax wage to income from both private and social wealth suffers a permanent decline so the reduction in labor input has a permanent component. The issue is an empirical one. Faggio and Nickell (2006) have also questioned the adequacy of an explanation about the American-European work difference based on labor tax differences by pointing out a puzzle. Although the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) have increased their marginal tax rates on labor every bit as much as the Big Three Continental countries, their labor input has not declined by as much over the past three decades and is now only about 10 percent below that in the Anglo-Saxon countries. From the perspective of our theory, the long-term differences in hours worked among Continental Europe, the Scandinavian countries, and America must be due to differences in time and leisure preferences or the relative importance of social wealth in these countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. As a pedagogic device, large open economy. They explored the fiscal consequences in two types of labor market: a neoclassical one as well as one with an endogenous natural rate of unemployment derived from labor turnover.
The Textbook Model
To understand the role played by wealth adjustment in offsetting the negative effect of labor taxes on labor supply, it is helpful to review the textbook model. In this model, the representative household maximizes U (C,L − L) dominates, which we take to be the case here, the increase in marginal tax rate on labor income discourages labor supply. In terms of Figure 1 , the household moves from the initial equilibrium point E 1 to E 2 . This, however, is only the initial impact of higher payroll taxes. As the household's take-home pay is reduced, personal savings fall and wealth decumulates. As unearned income, y w , gradually falls, the budget line (with a gentler slope reflecting the reduced hourly after-tax wage) shifts toward the origin. Could the unearned income fall so as to fully restore the number of hours worked, that is, to move the household to point E 3 ? To answer this question, we need a general-equilibrium model that endogenizes the process of wealth accumulation. We set out to do this in the next two sections, handling first the case of a small open economy that takes the external rate of interest as given and then the case of a large open economy whose asset accumulation has an influence on the external rate of interest.
The Small Open Economy
Following Prescott (2004) , our focus will be on an individual's choice of his time spent in market work, without substantive interest in the choice between non-market housework and time for leisure. However, in working with a model with overlapping generations as described in Blanchard (1985) , we face the possibility of some individuals who live forever having a rising consumption profile over their lifetimes even when the economy is in a steady state. This explains our modelling choice described in the next paragraph.
We explicitly model the choice of time spent in three activities: the market sector, non-market housework, and leisure. Building upon Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) , suppose that the utility function is given by
1/e , e ≤ 1. Here, l m is time spent 2 The reason we do not use an infinitely-lived representative agent model as in Prescott (2004) is that applying such a model in a world economy with perfect international capital mobility leads to national wealth being degenerate. To obtain non-degenerate wealth in the open economy, we can either use the Blanchard-Yaari model where all individuals face a constant and identical probability of death or a model of overlapping and unconnected infinitely-lived families as in Weil (1989) and Obstfeld (1989) . Our results in this paper carry through if we adopt the Weil-Obstfeld characterization of demographics instead of the Blanchardian characterization.
3 Since Prescott (2004) focuses on the choice of market work at the intensive rather than the extensive margin, the representative agent always supplies a positive number of hours to the market sector.
working in the market sector, l n is time spent in non-market housework, C m is consumption of the market good, and C n is consumption of the home produced non-market good. We assume that the non-market good is produced according to C n = s n l n ; s n > 0. Notice that as in Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) , we suppose that working in the market sector gives positive direct utility, presumably because one enjoys certain social interactions and mental stimulus at work that are especially valued. We assume that there is a fixed positive utility value from working in the market sector (given by B)
that is independent of the actual number of hours worked. In contrast, the utility value derived from housework comes indirectly from consuming the home-produced good generated by the time input into the non-market sector.
Making the further assumption that the direct utility value from spending a positive amount of time in the market is sufficiently large, in particular, that
we ensure that every living person in the economy spends a positive amount of time working in the market.
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Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) show that solving out for non-market housework, l n , we end up, in the CobbDouglas case with e = 0, the following reduced-form utility function:
The production structure of the economy is described as follows. There are two market goods: one internationally traded and the other a non-traded good. The internationally traded good, following Obstfeld (1989) , is a Solow good that can be used either for consumption or for addition to the capital 4 A very wealthy individual who might have chosen to retire in a model without a positive utility value from market work spends a very small positive amount of time working in the market (l m = 0 + ) given the positive utility value of market work compared to housework in our model.
stock. The non-traded good is a pure consumption good. We choose the traded good as numeraire.
Demographics are described as in Blanchard (1985) . Agents face an instantaneous probability of death θ that is constant throughout life. We now leave out the m subscript used earlier to index market good and market work, understanding that, using the reduced-form utility function (having solved out for l n and C n ), we refer now only to market goods and time spent in market work. 
, τ being the payroll tax rate. We make the assumption that workers of all age cohorts have the same productivity, face the same tax rate and receive the same entitlement
for all s. We let r(t) denote the real instantaneous short-term interest rate and ρ(> 0) the pure rate of time preference.
The agent maximizes
and a transversality condition that prevents agents from going indefinitely into debt. The solution to the agent's problem, after using two-stage budgeting, is given by
where human wealth is given by
Aggregating across all individuals, dropping the time index t and denoting per capita aggregate variables by capital letters, we obtain
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. We note that although every worker faces the same hourly pay, the fact that the members of the labor force are of different ages means that their wealth levels are different, and consequently, the number of hours worked will be different across the different age cohorts.
The government is assumed to run a balanced-budget policy and, for simplicity, we set government debt to zero. The government budget constraint can be expressed as
where
is the per capita level of government purchases, and tax revenue collected is from payroll taxation. Assuming that domestic residents own all the capital stock, K, and assuming free international lending and borrowing, W ≡ K + F , where F is the holding of net foreign assets. (Residents can always borrow from abroad to achieve this portfolio allocation.)
Taking the time derivative of (1), and using (3) and (4), we obtaiṅ
Using (1) in (6), we obtain, after re-arrangement of terms,
Let us now lay out the conditions satisfied by the production side of the economy. We assume that the non-traded good is the relatively laborintensive good.
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For simplicity, we suppose that producing a unit of the non- 
From (8), we see that k T is positively related to p and in conjunction with we use the market-clearing condition for the non-traded good sector:
The pure case of government purchases with no transfers
To understand the long-run effects of labor taxes, it is convenient to first focus on the steady state before turning to the dynamics. Kravis and Lipsey (1983) .
θ). Non-human private wealth is given by K + F so nonwage income (or unearned) income from private wealth is given by y w = (r +θ)(K +F ), which takes the form of annuity income, θ(K + F ) being the component called the actuarial dividend. Using these relations and (1) in (2), and rearranging, we obtain the steady-state labor-supply relation in manhours:
We also note that in a steady state, (7) can be expressed as
Suppose that the government now finances increased purchases (∆G) by raising payroll taxes. The key result from (11) and (12) To understand the dynamics, it is useful to note from (2) that labor supply is uniquely pinned down byC ≡ C/v h . We write L = µ(C); µ (C) < 0. Using (7), we can write in terms ofC,C
The evolution of private wealth is dictated bẏ
Noting that r = r * , and that v h is pinned down by r * and the value of τ , (13) and (14) give us a pair of dynamic equations inC and K + F , with the latter being a state variable. We assume that r * > ρ so that, in steady state, the representative household owns a positive level of wealth.
The phase diagram in Figure 2 shows that we obtain saddle-path stability. Figure 3 shows the dynamic response of the economy to a sudden permanent increase in the payroll tax rate, τ , which reduces v h , used to finance government purchases. Recalling that labor supply is inversely related toC, we see that the maximum contraction in employment occurs initially. However, as private wealth gradually declines, employment recovers until in the new steady state, employment is exactly back to where it was before the policy.
A sudden permanent increase in payroll tax rates therefore produces a temporary contraction of employment with the negative effect of higher payroll tax rates diminishing to zero as wealth decumulates.
Increase in payroll taxes to finance government transfers
In a steady state, aggregate human wealth, H, now equals (v Using these relations and (1) in (2), and rearranging, we obtain the steady-state labor-supply relation in manhours:
We also note that in a steady state, (7) is now expressed as ). In this case, the decline in income from private wealth in response to reduced take-home wage fails to offset the increase in income from social wealth (y g ) so the reduction in employment has a permanent component.
The Large Open Economy
It might be argued that if we consider a simultaneous increase in the payroll tax rate in each of the Continental European economies, it might be more appropriate to think of a large open economy whose dissaving is likely to affect the world interest rate. In this section, we extend the analysis to a large open economy. If payroll taxes raised to finance government purchases and transfers lead to a tightening of private savings, and the increased borrowing in the international capital market leads to an increase in the world interest rate, will the after-tax wage to unearned income ratio be permanently reduced? Taking the pure case of government purchases with no transfers, we suppose that as the large economy increases the stock of private wealth (K + F ), it acts to lower the real rate of interest, that is,
with an interest elasticity (defined with a positive sign) that we assume is less than one. We first determine what happens to the long-run rate of interest in response to the increase in labor taxes. Setting˙C = 0 in (13) gives
and settingK +Ḟ = 0 in (14) gives
Substitution of (K + F )/v h in (18) using (17) gives us
where we note that the lefthand side of (19) is increasing inC and the righthand side is decreasing in K + F . We plot this relationship as the downward-sloping schedule in Figure 5 .
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Note from (17) that we have a positively-sloped schedule that we also plot in Figure 5 . The intersection gives the initial equilibriumC and K + F , and hence the initial steadystate rate of interest. At given K + F , we see from (17) that an increase in the payroll tax rate lowers v h and so shifts up the positively-sloped schedule.
Consequently, an increase in the payroll tax rate raises the real rate of interest in the long run, increasesC, and thus decreases employment.
6 Notice that in the case of a small open economy taking the external rate of interest as given, this line is horizontal.
To recapitulate, an increase in the payroll tax rate in a large open economy such as Continental Europe leads, in the long run, to a decline in European employment so the higher marginal tax rate does have a permanent negative effect on employment. The reason is that the dissaving that is brought about by reduced take-home pay raises the world interest rate, which prevents private wealth from falling enough to restore the after-tax wage to non-wage income ratio back to its original level. This does not imply, however, that another country, say America, with unchanged (lower) payroll tax rates will have higher employment. In fact, if preferences, including the subjective rate of time preference, and mortality rate are identical and there is no hindrance to the cross-border mobility of capital so each country faces a common world interest rate, the fiscal shock in Europe acts also to contract
American employment by the same amount in the long run. The economic mechanism producing this result is that wealth accumulation in America (which runs a current account surplus) that is stimulated by the higher world interest rate brought about by European dissaving leads to a decline in the wage to non-wage income ratio in America. In fact, with both America and Europe facing the common world interest rate, (11) and (12) shows that, given r, there is an equalization of the employment rates in the long run despite different payroll tax rates.
Studying the dynamics is now straightforward. Setting r = R(K + F )
in (13) and (14) and using the factor-price frontier relationship making v f a decreasing function of r, we can study the economy's response to an increase in payroll taxes used to finance government purchases. The adjustment path in response to a sudden permanent increase in τ is shown in Figure 6 . The impact of the labor taxes on employment is greatest initially, and wealth decumlation once again leads to diminishing negative effects of higher payroll taxes although there is now a permanent negative component as world interest rate is pushed up.
One result in the large open economy case is noteworthy. Suppose that the government purchases child-care services, which we regard as a non-traded good and thus relatively labor-intensive, and pays for it with higher payroll taxes. The model suggests that as savings decline and the economy ends up borrowing from the international capital market and pushes up the world interest rate, child-care services become relatively cheaper in terms of the traded good. The reason is that the higher interest rate means that wage costs (v f ) faced by the firm are lowered. As child-care services are relatively labor-intensive, their relative price declines.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proved the proposition that a permanent increase in payroll taxes used to finance government purchases in a small open economy that takes the external rate of interest as given is neutral for employment in the long run. However, if the economy in question is large in the sense that an increase in its borrowing in the world capital market pushes up the world interest rate, the neutrality breaks down.
In the large open economy case, the higher world interest rate, in lowering the after-tax wage to unearned income ratio, reduces permanently the number of hours supplied. This does not mean, however, that the other economies in the integrated world economy with lower payroll tax rates have higher employment. As these economies run current account surpluses, stimulated by the higher world interest rate, their wage to non-wage income ratios fall causing the number of hours worked in the low-payroll-tax economies also to decline. If preferences are identical across countries, there is an equalization of employment across countries despite differences in payroll tax rates. Different marginal tax rates on labor, therefore, cannot explain long-run differences in hours worked across countries if capital is internationally mobile. 
